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ABSTRACT: Carbon leakage has become the core issue of emission trading 
systems. Using data from Hubei Province, this paper identifies the drawbacks of the 
prevailing methods for preventing carbon leakage and proposes a new methodology to 
overcome them, namely, Emission Control Coefficients. In contrast to the common 
tiered structure method, we found that Emission Control Coefficients generate a 
dynamic and continuous emission control coefficient for each industry which will 
improve the effectiveness and fairness of allowance allocation, set aside sufficient 
time for the low carbon transformation of industries, and balance the needs to protect 
competitiveness and decarbonize and are particularly suitable for the emission trading 
systems of developing counties. This paper makes three main academic contributions: 
Firstly, this paper proposes a new indicator, the abatement potential. Secondly, this 
paper better distinguishes industrial differences. Thirdly, this paper can better respond 
to the problem of excess allowances due to technological advances and trade pattern 
changes.  
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Emission Trading Systems (ETS) are used to minimize the cost of reducing CO2 
emissions. However, carbon leakages may occur if some countries and regions do not 
introduce comparable policies, and this will lead to imbalances in carbon constraints 
in different countries (IPCC, 2007). Given that CO2 emissions in countries with 
carbon constraints will decrease, global CO2 emissions will not necessarily fall since 
CO2 emissions in countries without carbon constraints will increase, and make the 
ETS ineffective. Stakeholders, especially emission-intensive industries under ETS’ 
and carbon tax schemes, have expressed concern about the implications of ETS’ when 
they compete with firms located in jurisdictions without carbon constraints. Policy 
makers often use Border Tax Adjustments (BTA)† and Free Allowances (FA) to 
reduce the risk of carbon leakages when designing an ETS. BTAs theoretically 
perform best with respect to carbon leakage prevention and incentives for emissions 
reduction, but they face political and legal challenges. In reality, the most commonly 
applied method for preventing carbon leakages is the FA (Marcu et al., 2013). 
FAs that have been in discontinuous use and have become outdated have caused 
partial failure of ETS’. Fox example, when determining which industries should be 
subjected to carbon leakage risk, the European Union’s ETS uses a simple dichotomy 
classification and historical data which result in excess allowance supply, and 
                                                             




consequently a low carbon price: a reason that symbolizes the failure of the EU’s ETS 
(Clò, 2010; Crossland et al., 2013). Outdated data also ignore technological progress 
and changing trade patterns. Other major ETS’, such as in California, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Korea, have all introduced policies aimed at the prevention of 
carbon leakages (World Bank, 2015), which are basically the same as the EU’s ETS 
and thus suffer similar problems.  
However, the policy makers and market participants will never be able to 
perfectly anticipate in advance the future developments which will determine the 
actual constraint. Thus, the prices can hardly be maintained at desirable levels (de 
Perthuis and Trotignon, 2014) and this constitutes another important lesson from the 
EU’s ETS. As a matter of fact, the difficulty in maintaining desirable prices in trading 
schemes is not peculiar to the EU’s ETS. In the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative of 
the US, emissions were lower than previously anticipated due to low natural gas 
prices prompting a conversion to the lower-emitting fuel. 
When China launched its nationwide ETS on 19 December 2017, it was able to 
draw lessons from other ETS’ and thereby improve the allowance allocation method. 
The Chinese national ETS faces many challenges that have not been seen in other 
ETS. Firstly, China has been emphasizing carbon intensity targets, not absolute 
emission reduction targets in its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDC) (NDRC, 2015). Consequently, China's cap needs to be converted and will 
have to be flexible. Secondly, with the ongoing structural reforms on the supply side, 
China's economic is undergoing rapid transformation. Therefore, China’s ETS must 
have a dynamic mechanism of allowance allocation which will provide great 
flexibility in dealing with the uncertainty from structural change(Sun et al., 2016). 
Thirdly, China’s national ETS also needs to introduce an innovative method to 
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manage two conflicts of interest: On the one hand, if China wants its ETS to stimulate 
investment in low-carbon technologies, it will have to maintain relatively high carbon 
prices. On the other hand, China needs to protect its carbon-intensive industries which 
still have important roles in the national economy. 
Rather than simply adopting the policies of developed countries, China must 
design its own allowances allocation methodology. Otherwise, it will not only face the 
dilemma of the collapse of carbon prices, as happened with the EU ETS, but also not 
cope with China's particular problems. Beyond the typical concerns of most 
developed countries, China's carbon leakage prevention policy must consider 
abatement potential in order to remove outdated firms and industries, a priority of the 
current government(State Council, 2013). The Chinese situation is similar to that in 
other developing countries. Hence China’s carbon leakage prevention policy is of 
high reference significance for developing countries. 
This paper innovatively proposes Emissions Control Coefficients (ECCs) under 
China’s national ETS for the prevention of carbon leakages. It aims to calculate ECCs 
for each industry to determine its free allowance proportion. It would seem that ECCs 
have real policy relevance for China and other developing countries as an alternative 
carbon leakage prevention policy.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
existing literature and policies on carbon leakage, Section 3 analyses major problems 
with the current FA methods, and Section 4 discusses the proposed methodology and 
explains the construction of the three indicators and how the three indicators are 
integrated to set up the ECCs. Using Hubei Province data, Section 5 demonstrates 
how to apply the ECCs and explains their relative advantages compared to the 
existing FA methodology. Section 6 concludes the paper with policy implications. 
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2. Literature Review 
Preventing carbon leakages is a core issue in any ETS design. Asymmetric 
carbon constraints between countries can alter the competitiveness of industries and 
lead to carbon leakages, which can greatly reduce the environmental contribution of 
an ETS and damage ETS countries’ welfare. In the case of the EU’s ETS, the carbon 
leakages and negative effects on competitiveness have been quite serious (Antimiani 
et al., 2016). The metal and chemical industries present the highest leakage rates. In 
California, the carbon market there is leaking 33.5-58.9 million tons of CO2  through 
2020 (Cullenward, 2014). In recent years the problem of carbon leakages from 
industries has been widely addressed in the literature (Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012; 
Fischer et al., 2017). The competitiveness channel is the main source of carbon 
leakage, while the demand channel is smallest ones(Tan et al., 2018). 
Broadly, there are two main instruments to avoid carbon leakages. One 
instrument is to set up a system of BTAs, which impose the carbon cost on importers 
and refund the carbon cost to exporters. Therefore, they are often perceived to be 
more effective at reducing leakage (Caron, 2012). Firm-targeted carbon tariffs deliver 
larger leakage reduction and global welfare gains (Böhringer et al., 2017). The policy 
of combining a consumption tax and an output-based rebate can be equivalent to a 
border carbon adjustment and is a robust policy to mitigate carbon leakage. However, 
BTAs may impede domestic industrial decarbonisation (Schinko et al., 2014). For 
example, with a BTA on clinker, companies directly import cement from no ETS area 
in the EU ETS (Allevi et al., 2017). The effectiveness of carbon tariffs in reducing 
carbon leakage is limited(Antimiani et al., 2013), and BTAs are not optimal policy 
tools to address carbon leakage concerns (Sakai and Barrett, 2016).There are some 
problems that make the BTAs relatively less practicable as they create the potential 
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for conflict with the WTO and other free trade rules(Rocchi et al., 2018). The policy 
makers should evaluate the effectiveness of border adjustments from both 
perspectives of forward and backward industrial linkages and especially focus on the 
sectors with a greater level of global production fragmentation (Zhang and Zhu, 
2017). 
The other instrument is providing a FA for controlling emissions companies. 
This has emerged as the preferred and practical method for preventing the risk of 
carbon leakages. The most salient example of the use of FAs is within the EU’s ETS 
where the method of preventing carbon leakages is to list risk industries according to 
their cost intensity and trade intensity (Monjon and Quirion, 2011). On the risk list, in 
principle, industries are eligible to receive 100% of the FAs. For industries not on the 
risk list, the proportion of FAs is to be gradually reduced. In 2013, the proportion was 
80% and it is to be reduced by 30% every year to 2020. The FA instrument in general 
many have a limited effect and thus proper design is needed. If the allocation of FAs 
is phased out too rapidly, firms in regulated industries may enjoy the benefits of an 
initially generous policy, but do not invest enough in abatement equipment to render 
the option to stay in their home-country (Martin et al., 2014; Schmidt and Heitzig, 
2014). Research on the US carbon market shows that freely allocating fewer than 15% 
of the emission allowances generally suffices to prevent profit losses in the most 
vulnerable American industries. Freely allocating all of the allowances substantially 
overcompensates these industries(Goulder et al., 2010). 
There are also many questions and criticisms about the free allocation of 
allowances. Increasing the share of free allocations for emission allowances, as 
opposed to auctions, has no effect on environmental quality but reallocates resources 
among firms toward the most productive ones which has an impact on firms' entry 
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and exit decisions, the mass of firms, and the composition of the market (Anouliès, 
2017). In the EU ETS, grandfathering of EUAs can turn a penalization for carbon 
intensive industries into an incentive (Falbo et al., 2013). This might call for a 
sectorial- and country-differentiated anti-leakage risk policy. A sensitivity analysis 
suggests stronger leakage protection measures for coastal areas than in landlocked 
areas because they are well protected by transport costs(Meunier et al., 2014). The 
competitiveness of the steel sector seems to be better protected against the impact of 
the EU’s ETS. For the oil refining sector, it seems that, again, freely allocated 
allowances as proposed by the EU policy would not be justified, and that different 
countries and industries, with different industry structures and costs, will be subject to 
different degrees and types of leakage risks (Santamaría et al., 2014). Free allocation 
not only foregoes the opportunity to raise revenue, but can also introduce a number of 
efficiency and fairness concerns (Burtraw and McCormack, 2017). 
There is a growing number of studies on ETS designs for China, from either the 
subnational (sectorial or regional) level or the national level. Xiong et.al, (Xiong et 
al., 2017) examined China’s allowances mechanism from two aspects: allowance 
allocation and allowance distribution, through comparing China’s carbon trading 
pilots with the EU’s ETS and California’s Cap and Trade Program. Following the 
launch of China’s pilot ETS projects in 2011, some scholars have focused on the 
design of the regional ETS’ in specific provinces or cities (Li and Lu, 2015; Qi et al., 
2014). The initial allowance allocation under a certain abatement target would hardly 
affect sectoral production but remarkably affect trade behaviors in the carbon trading 
markets in China (Yu et al., 2018).The best choice of ETS allowance allocation 
scheme in the electricity sector would be the scheme that is based on historical 
emission intensity(Lirong et al., 2018).  
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Few studies have been carried out which examine sector competitiveness in 
China. Wang et al. (Wang et al., 2017) analyzed potential carbon leakage risk within 
and outside an ETS and found that six four-digit industries will be exposed to carbon 
leakages under a regulated electricity pricing mechanism, and the leakage could be 
serious if the percentage of auctioning increases or if the electricity market is 
liberalized in the future (Long et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018). Zhu et.al. (Zhu et al., 
2017) demonstrated that the allocation of FAs can cause a competitiveness distortion 
among normal and outdated capacities. Given the government's intentions to remove 
outdated capacity and to upgrade production technology, an output-based allocation 
approach is suggested for China's iron and steel sector. Lin et.al. (Lin et al., 2015) 
suggested that the electricity industry should be given FAs and at the same time the 
price of electricity should be kept constant in order to maintain a balance between 
CO2 emission reduction and industry upgrading. The research on the evaluation of 
carbon leakage channels shows that the competitiveness channel is the main source of 
leakage and that the energy channel is modest due to limited energy price fall (Xiujie 
et al., 2018). 
Through reviewing the literature, we find that the existing research mainly 
includes: the measurement of the carbon leakage degree in developed countries, and 
the design of carbon leakage prevention policy and its implementation effect 
evaluation, the design of China's ETS and its economic impact and the impact of 
China's ETS on industry competitiveness and other aspects. Therefore, there are still 
some gaps that need to be made up: (1) There is no relevant research on solving the 
industrial inequities brought about by the dichotomy of the carbon leakage policy. (2) 
There is no relevant research for solving the problem of excessive allowances and 
price collapse caused by the non-dynamic adjustment of the carbon leakage policy. 
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(3) Most of the existing research does not aim to formulate a carbon leakage policy 
for applicability to the ETS’ of developing countries. 
Based on China's actual situation, this paper proposes a carbon leakage 
prevention policy. This paper makes three main academic contributions: Firstly, 
different from the FA in the EU and other prevailing ETS’ that include two indicators, 
this paper proposes a third indicator, the abatement potential, which gives industries 
with higher emission intensities a higher pressure to reduce emissions and encourage 
these industries to catch up with the reference group. Secondly, this paper breaks the 
widely used "dichotomy" categories applied by industries to determine the percentage 
for FAs, and forms a continuous value. It is thus better able to distinguish industrial 
differences and avoid inequality between industries in and out of the risk groups. 
Thirdly, ECCs can better respond to technological advances and trade pattern changes 
and thus balance the need to protect industrial competitiveness with the incentive to 
decarbonize, which is more applicable to the ETS’ of developing countries. 
3. Problems with Current Carbon Leakage Prevention Policies 
The most common carbon leakage prevention policies in the world have a tiered 
structure, such as the EU’s ETS, in which there are only minor differences in the 
selection of the indicator, calculation formula, and number of tiers. Policy makers 
must make a judgment as to how to determine the relevant eligibility and assistance 
thresholds. Two main indicators: carbon intensity and trade intensity have been 
generally used, either in isolation or combination. There are no significant differences 
between ETSs with respect to how activities or industries that are at risk of carbon 
leakage are identified. The European, Californian, Australian and Korean ETS’ all use 
criteria based on trade intensity and energy or carbon intensity to identify industries at 
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risk. However, a wide variety of thresholds and definitions are used. Carbon intensity 
captures the impact that carbon pricing has on a particular firm or sector, and it is 
measured as the volume of emissions per unit of output, revenue, value added, profit, 
or other similar economic metric (the term emissions intensity can be used 
interchangeably). Trade intensity can be thought of as a proxy for the ability of a firm 
or sector to pass on costs without significant loss of market share. In Table 1, we 
summarize the main policies currently used in various ETS’ under the FA allocation.  
In the existing policy, industries are often classified into either two or three 
categories in terms of significance of carbon leakage that is measured by two 
indicators among cost intensity, trade intensity and carbon (energy) intensity. The 
third phase of the EU’s ETS used two indicators, namely cost intensity and trade 
intensity from 2009 to 2011, to divide the industries into two categories: risk and no 
risk. The risk industries are to receive 100% FAs until 2020 and more than 83% of the 
Phase 3 FAs will be granted to installations deemed to be at a significant risk of 
carbon leakage. In its Proposal for Phase 4, the EU’s ETS will employ better targeted 
carbon leakage rules and split industries into three categories: “very high”, “high” and 
“medium”. Once an industry classification is confirmed it will remain unchanged for 
five years. This combination of trade exposure and emissions intensity can also be 
found in California’s ETS, which then leads to a classification in three categories: 
high, medium and low leakage risk [29]. The Australian ETS divided industries into 
two categories, namely, emissions intensity and trade exposure. However, its industry 
must be qualified as trade-exposed before an emissions-intensity criterion is applied 
for further classification. On the basis of these two criteria, industries are then 
categorized as either highly or moderately emissions-intensive activities in Australia’s 
ETS. Differing from the EU’s ETS, the level of emissions intensity in Australia’s ETS 
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is not based on production costs, but is instead calculated as either tons of emissions 
over revenue or tons of emissions over value added. New Zealand’s ETS also uses a 
measure of revenue to define emissions intensity. If an emission-intensive industry is 
not trade-exposed, it will need to purchase allowances. In the case of a trade-exposed 
and emission-intensive industry, it will receive FAs. The Korean ETS divides 
industries into two categories: energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE), and not 
EITE. Each classification leads to a specific level of FAs and the levels are diversified 
among countries (Table 1). 
As the world's first carbon market, the EU’s ETS has accumulated extensive 
experience in the design and operation of carbon leakage prevention policies, but 
there are also many problems, so it has been widely criticized. However, the criticism 
suggests that the methodology of the ETS Directive 2009/29/EC, which amended the 
first ETS Directive 2003/87 2009/29/EC was politically driven with highly 
arbitrariness and inefficient criteria to assess which industries are exempted from 
auctioning, thus causing unfairness (Clò, 2010). The first problem is about the 
reference price and reference periods. When the Commission calculated the 
appropriate level of protection against carbon leakages, it used a reference carbon 
price of EUR 30/tCO2. In the third phase up to 2017, carbon prices were consistently 
below EUR 7/tCO2. The reference periods were 2005-2007 for the carbon leakage list 
applied during 2013-2014, and 2009-2011 for the carbon leakage list applied from 
2015 to 2019. The fixed reference period did not reflect the changes that have taken 
place in technologies and the global patterns of trade during the actual times. The 
second most criticized aspect has been using tiered criteria for the classification of 
industries because it results in significant inequities. For example, according to the 
EU’s ETS policy, if industry A has a trade intensity of 30% and industry B has a trade 
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intensity of 29%, then industry A will receive 100% FAs in 2020 and industry B will 
receive only 30%, leading to serious inequality in the competitiveness between the 
two industries(Clò, 2010).  
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The main program with the tiered criteria to classify industry is illustrated in 
Figure 1. In Figure 1, the industries are classified according to two categories: cost 
intensity (CI1) and trade intensity (TI1). In the EU’s ETS, industries where the CI or 
TI fall into the A (A1+A2), B (B1+B2) and C (C1+C2+C3+C4) areas are included in the 
carbon leakage risk list. If CI0 ≤ CI < CI1 and TI0 ≤ TI < TI1, industries where the 
CI or TI fall into the D area will also be included in the carbon leakage risk list. In 
contrast, industries which fall into the E（E1+E2+E3）area are not identified as 
carbon leakage risk. Obviously, this discontinuous classification method will bring 
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unfairness among industries E and others. 
 
Figure1 Tiered structure and criteria 
 
The EU’s ETS in phase IV (2020-2030) will split leakage risk into three tiers: 
“very high”, “high” and “medium” and use a single indicator calculated by 
multiplying emissions intensity with trade intensity, which is called a Classification 
Reference (CR). As shown in Figure 1, the industry will be categorized into three 
categories with CR1 and CR2, those for the low risk industries below the CR1 curve, 
those for medium risk industries between CR1 and CR2, and those which are higher 
than CR2 for high risk industries. Although this reform reduces the unfairness in 
allowance allocation among industries, it still cannot fundamentally solve the 
inequality issues for industries that are on different sides but close to the boundary.  
Since all the major ETS’ adopt the tiered structure, they face the same problems. 
For example, California’s ETS classifies leakage risk into three categories through 
combining the metrics of emissions intensity and trade exposure. It uses a more 
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CI and TI into only two segments with CI1 and TI1 , California’s ETS divides CI and 
TI into three segments with CI1, CI2, TI1, and TI2 (Figure 1). On the other hand, 
California’s ETS gives a higher priority logic for emission intensity. The emission 
intensity can directly determine which industry type is included, but trade intensity 
needs to be combined with emission intensity to make judgments, which involve 
minor logic. In order to demonstrate more fully the classification method of the 
California ETS, we further divide the B and C area of Figure 1 into four parts. 
According to the classification method of California’s ETS, A1, C1 and C2 are directly 
identified as high-risk industries due to their position above CI2. However, despite 
falling to the right of TI2, only C4 will be identified as high-risk industries, while B2 
and B4 will not be considered as high-risk industries. They will instead be considered 
as medium and low risk industries, respectively. 
Furthermore, at the industry level, the impacts of economic fluctuations, 
technological advances and trade pattern changes are significant, resulting in 
significant changes in the cost constraints of ETS’ on industries over time, and thus 
further undermining the fixed reference base analysis. In addition, the data used in the 
classification of industries are old and there is a lack of a dynamic adjustment 
mechanism. This exposes failure risks to carbon leakage policies due to their 
excessive cost constraints on some industries and loose cost constraints on others, 
further creating a new industrial competitiveness distortion. 
4. An Alternative Method: Emission Control Coefficients (ECCs) 
The fundamental function of an ETS is to encourage enterprises to carry out 
R&D and investment in low-carbon technologies through market-oriented means, in 
order to achieve emission mitigation targets at the lowest cost. However, there are 
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differences in many aspects including trade intensity, cost intensity and abatement 
potential between industries, resulting in the presence of imbalanced and uneven 
impacts in all industries imposed by the ETS. These, in turn, could cause unfairness 
among industries as in the EU’s ETS. A carbon intensive but economically important 
industry could be disadvantaged and even destroyed by carbon prices. Therefore, 
different industries should be given different treatments in determining the proportion 
of free allowances in order to reflect the industries’ differences more accurately.  
To overcome the problems in the current and prevailing carbon leakage policies, 
we propose an alternative method for the Chinese national ETS, that is, ECCs. EECs 
have three indicators. The first two, cost intensity and trade intensity, are commonly 
used in other ETS’ in developed countries. The third is the abatement potential (AP) 
indicator to dynamically reflect the gap between the technological level of an industry 
in developing countries and the reference case, such as the world advanced level. The 
AP indicator is a specific indicator for developing countries. Unlike developed 
countries, the technologies used by intensive carbon industries in developing 
countries are still at the middle and lower levels and thus need time to transfer into 
low-carbon modes. However, just like trade protectionism, an ETS cannot provide 
indefinite protection to the industries. Thus, the carbon market needs to gradually 
increase the strictness of cost constraints to push these industries towards low carbon 
modes. 
4.1 The advantages of ECCs 
The proposed ECCs have three advantages: 1) the classification of industries is 
based on a continuous value; 2) the allocation method can be dynamically adjusted; and 
3) the cost constraint tightens incrementally. A more detailed discussion of each of the 
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goals is given below. 
First, the continuous ECCs can effectively overcome the drawbacks of the tiered 
structure by giving each industry a unique emission control coefficient based on its 
characteristics. This method can accurately distinguish differences between industries 
and thus avoid a greater impact on the competitiveness of an industry. Continuous 
ECCs can also improve the fairness of allowance allocations, reduce the quantity of 
invalid FAs and increase the effectiveness of carbon price signals, so as to better 
encourage enterprises to invest in low carbon technologies. 
Second, ECCs dynamically adjust by updating the indicator values instead of 
using a fixed value for a certain year to reflect changes in the characteristics of the 
industries in a timely manner, further improve the effectiveness of allowance 
allocations to avoid carbon price collapse as in the EU’s ETS, and raise the 
effectiveness of carbon price signals.  
Thirdly, ECCs introduce a gradual tightening process instead of a quick and 
hurried one. The AP indictor will give consideration to the different abatement 
potentials of different industries and ensure there will be no big bang for any industry. 
They can also be consistent with governments which may prefer to keep some energy 
intensive industries for economic reasons at a particular stage of economic 
development. In this methodology, the advanced industries will be given smaller 
abatement pressures; and conversely outdated industries will be given more pressure 
to reduce emissions. This is to reflect the technology gap between assessed industries 
and their global frontiers. For those industries that have a carbon intensity that is close 
to the advanced world’s level, the limited abatement potential will be recognized by 
allocating more FAs compared to those further away from the frontier. Moreover, 
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with respect to the AP indicator, while leaving time for the industry, it also clearly 
signals the gradual tightening of cost constraints to stimulate industries to effectively 
reduce emissions. In the Chinese context, the AP indicator functions like industrial 
policies and coincides with the supply-side structural reforms carried out by the state 
such as done in the coal industry (Shi et al., 2018). 
4.2 Calculation of the three indicators 
Due to the dynamic characteristic of ECCs, the indictor will be industry specific 
and time varied. Thus, each indictor is indexed by industry, i , and year, t . 
4.2.1 Trade Intensity (TI) 
TI mainly reflects the competition pressures that an industry faces in 
international trade. The larger the value, the greater the international competition it 
faces and the lower its ability to pass through carbon costs, and thus the greater the 
risk of carbon leakages. Therefore, an industry of this sort should receive a larger 
proportion of free allowances. Conversely, the smaller the value is, the lower the 
percentage of FA should be given. For example, the power and cement sectors’ TIs 
are very low. Thus, they should be granted a smaller proportion of FA. Otherwise, just 
as in the first phase of the EU’s ETS, the power and cement sectors will gain an 
enormous amount of windfall profits (Darby, 2016; Sijm et al., 2006). In the proposed 
methodology, we adopt the EU’s ETS trade intensity calculation method, as follows:  
TIit =
exports𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + imports𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
total industrial output𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ imports𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
       （1） 
   The trade intensity is calculated at the industrial level. Each index in this formula 
refers to one industry’s index, e.g. exports refer to one specific industry’s exports. 
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4.2.2 Cost intensity (CI) 
     CI reflects the cost pressure imposed by an ETS on industries. Unlike most 
other ETS’ that use emission intensity instead of CI, we argue that only the 
combination of emission and price can reflect the real cost constraints that firms face. 
Therefore, we again adopt the EU’s ETS formula which considers both emissions and 
carbon prices. However, instead of using a fixed carbon price of 30 euros, we suggest 
using the average annual carbon prices in the previous year which can better reflect 
the reality of the industries’ cost constraints. The industry specific CI is calculated as 
follows: 
CIit =
industry’s carbon emissions𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖×annual average Carbon price𝑖𝑖
 indusry′s value added𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
   （2） 
The larger the value of CI, the greater the impact of the ETS on the industry and 
the greater the risk of carbon leakages. Therefore, this industry should receive more 
free allowances. 
4.2.3 Abatement Potential (AP) 
AP measures the abatement potential of an industry, which is represented by the 
ratio of carbon intensity between the assessed industry’s value and the reference 
value. The reference value can take different values according to the actual situation. 
For example, a regional ETS can take the nation's average or advanced level of this 
industry; and a national ETS can take the international advanced level in this industry. 
With the greater AP and lower marginal abatement costs, an industry should receive 
fewer FAs in order to increase its cost constraints and push it to upgrade its 





  carbon intensity𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 reference value𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
    （3） 
If the AP is less than 1, the industry's abatement technology is more advanced 
than the reference value, indicating it has a low AP and thus a high marginal 
abatement cost. This industry should receive a high proportion of FAs in order to 
reduce its cost constraints. On the country, if the AP is greater than 1, the industry's 
abatement technology is outdated. 
4.3 Construction of ECCs 
This section of the paper introduces ECCs for each industry in the initial allowances 
allocation scheme through integrating the three indicators. This is done so as to fully 
reflect the impacts imposed by an ETS, improve the effectiveness and fairness of the 
allowance allocation, maximize the incentive effects, and avoid carbon leakages. An 
ECC is a continuous coefficient between 0 and 1. The larger the ECC, the more FAs 
an industry should receive; the smaller the ECC is, the fewer FAs it should receive. 
According to the average GDP growth rate and the carbon intensity target, and taking 
into consideration different industries’ trade intensities, cost intensities and abatement 
potentials, the ECC for industry i at year t is calculated using the following steps: 
 
     Step 1: Standardization of TI, CI and AP. In order to permit the normalized 
indicators to have the same direction trade intensity and cost intensity so as to adopt 
reverse standardization, and permit abatement potentials to adopt positive 
standardization, the following calculations must be performed:  
STIit= (TImax-TIit) /(TImax-TImin)        (4) 
SCIit= (CImax-CIit)/(CImax-CImin)        (5) 
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APit= (APit-APmin)/(APmax-APmin)      (6) 
Where max is the maximum value of the sample data and min is the minimum value 
of the sample data. STIit, SCIit and SAPit represent standardized TIit, CIit and APit. 
After standardization, the values of the three indicators are all between 0-1 so that 
they can be compared with each other: the standardization still preserves relative 
performance gaps between industries after standardization (Zhou et al., 2017). 
Step 2: Determine the Average Emissions Decreasing Rates (AEDRs). 
According to the forecasting growth rate of GDP and the INDC target, governments 
will determine an annual national target for carbon intensity reduction rate, namely 
the AEDRjt. This is a factor useful for developing countries where the INDC is a 
relative intensity target rather than an absolute emissions reduction. As a result, the 
caps will be different every year, and may increase or decrease, depending on the total 
carbon emissions and economic growth rate. 
     Step 3: According to the AEDRjt, the calculated decline coefficients for STIit, 
SCIit and SAPit and respectively get TIDCijt, CIDCijt, and APDCijt, which represent the 
rate of carbon emissions reduction that needs to be achieved in the i-th industry under 













     Among them, n is the total number of industries covered by ETS, i values 1, 2, 
..., n, representing the industry, j values 1,2, ..., m, representing different AEDRt.  
    Step 4: Assign the weights to three coefficients, and compute the comprehensive 
decline coefficient for each industry (CDCijt): 
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CDCijt =α× TIDCijt +β× CIDCijt +γ× APDCijt      （10） 
𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 represent the weighting factors, respectively, and their values need 
to be determined by the decision makers according to their policy preferences.  
o If more emphasis is given to the international competitive pressures, decision 
makers can give greater weight to TIDC.  
o If more emphasis is given to cost constraints, decision makers can give greater 
weight to CIDC.  
o If more emphasis is given to the abatement potential, decision makers can give 
greater weight to APDC.  
In fact, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1, when considering indicators, decision 
makers must consider the priority logic or weight. For example, the EU’s ETS gives 
CI and TI the same weight, but California’s ETS gives CI absolute logical priority. In 
the ECC method, this is also an unavoidable problem. According to the actual 
situation, decision makers need to determine an appropriate weight value for TIDC, 
ACDC, and APDC. 
Step 5: Convert CDC to Emissions Control Coefficient (ECCijt) for each industry. 
The CDC represents the proportion of emissions that each industry needs to reduce. 
But to enable ECCs to be used directly for allowance allocation systems, we also need 
to do some conversion: 
ECCijt= 1- CDCijt                     （11） 
In Figure 2, we summarize the complete computational process of ECCs in a 




Notes: The definitions of trade intensity, cost intensity and abatement potential 
are detailed in Section 4.2. This figure demonstrates how to use these three independent 
variables to form a weighted average value, that is, the ECC. 
Figure 2. The Calculation Steps for Emissions Control Coefficients 
5. A case study of Hubei Province  
Based on the above formula, we use data for Hubei Province and China to 
calculate the ECC for each of the 16 industries covered by Hubei’s ETS, and test the 
applicability of the ECC. Hubei Province, located in central China, was designated as 
one of seven locations for ETS pilots in China. Hubei Province is in the late stages of 
industrialization. Similar to many developing countries, its heavy industries have 
played a very important role in its economy.  
5.1 Data 
















CIDCijt=n×AEDRjt ×( ⁄𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
Comprehensive Decline Coefficient (CDC)
CDCijt =α × TIDCijt +β × CIDCijt +γ × APDCijt





𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖-𝑆𝑆min) / (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆max-𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆min)
Decline Coefficient (APDCijt)
APDCijt=n×AEDRjt × ⁄(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
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quantity of an industry’s energy consumption multiplied by the emission factors. 
Since the Hubei Statistical Yearbook reports only four kinds of energy consumption ̶ 
raw coal, gasoline, diesel, electricity ̶ this paper considers only four kinds of energy 
consumption. Among them, raw coal, gasoline and diesel emit direct emissions from 
industries, while electricity emits indirect emissions. The emission factors of raw coal, 
gasoline, and diesel are sourced from the IPCC (IPCC, 2006). The emission factor of 
electricity is taken from the Central China Power Grid published by the Climate 
Department of the National Development and Reform Commission. Following the 
launch of Hubei’s ETS on 2 April 2014, 30 June has been designated Hubei’s ETS 
Performance Date. The 2015 carbon price was set as the average price from 2 April 
2014 to 30 June 2015, at 20.41 yuan/ton. The 2016 carbon price was set as the 
average price from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016, at 24.30 yuan/ton. The industry 
added value data is from the Hubei Provincial Input-Output Table and Hubei 
Statistical Yearbook compiled by the Hubei Provincial Bureau of Statistics and Hubei 
Provincial Input-Output Office. Likewise, for the calculation of TI, the import, export 
and total output data of various industries were obtained from these publications. The 
market competition pressure of an industry in Hubei Province is not only from the 
same industry globally, but also from the same industry in other regions of China. 
However, due to limited data availability, in the Hubei case study we did not take the 
trade between Hubei and other provinces of China into account. Furthermore, to keep 
the methodology applicable at the national level, which is the most likely application 
scenario, we only measured competition from international trade. 
In the calculation of the AP, for Hubei Province’s industry i, we chose average 
carbon intensity of national industry i as the reference value to estimate the AP. In 
order to be comparable with the data of Hubei Province, only four kinds of energy 
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consumption  ̶ raw coal, gasoline, diesel, electricity  ̶ were measured in the 
calculation of CO2 emissions from national industries using the emission factors of 
the IPCC (IPCC, 2006). The emission factor of electricity was also taken from State 
Grid published by the Climate Department of the National Development and Reform 
Commission. The energy consumption data comes from the China Energy Statistical 
Yearbooks and the output value of each industry comes from the China Industrial 
Statistical Yearbooks. 
5.2 The three indicators 
In this subsection, we briefly introduce the calculation results for the three 
indicators. From Table 2, we see that Hubei’s ETS did not put a lot of cost pressures 
on the industries: the highest cost intensity was less than 5% and only five industries 
had a cost intensity of more than 1%. However, there are still obvious inter-industry 
differences. For example, the highest cost intensity of ‘Production and Supply of 
Electric Power and Heat Power’ was 24 times that of the lowest cost intensity of 
‘Processing of Food from Agricultural Products’. 
Among the 16 industries covered by Hubei’s ETS, the industry with the highest 
trade intensity was ‘Oil and Natural Gas industries’, and the lowest trade intensity 
industry was ‘Production and Supply of Electric Power and Heat Power’; the former 
was 26 times that of the latter. Although there was a big difference in trade intensity 
between different industries, the overall trade intensity among the industries in Hubei 
Province was relatively low. Only five industries’ trade intensity was more than 30% 
and six industries had a trade intensity of less than 20%. 
The carbon intensity of nine industries in Hubei Province was higher than the 
national average, and the carbon intensity of seven industries was lower than the 
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national average. The carbon intensity of ‘Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas’, 
‘Manufacture of Medicines’, etc. was much higher than the national average, but the 
carbon intensity of ‘Production and Supply of Electric Power and Heat Power’, 
‘Smelting and Processing of Ferrous Metals’ and other intensive carbon industries 
was much lower than the national average. The highest, ‘Extraction of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas’, was 8.9 times that of the lowest, ‘Smelting and Processing of Ferrous 
Metals’. Calculation results show that many industries in Hubei Province still have a 
great AP, compared with the national average carbon intensity.  
Table 2 Results of CI, TI and AP for industries in Hubei Province (2016) 
Industries CI（%） TI（%） AP 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.53 53.37 2.93 
Manufacture of Automobiles 0.19 23.28 1.41 
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers 1.45 35.19 1.8 
Manufacture of Foods 0.56 24.54 1.92 
Manufacture of General-Purpose Machinery 0.22 45.04 0.7 
Manufacture of Medicines 0.33 16.71 2.27 
Manufacture of Metal Products 0.43 20.5 0.82 
Manufacture of Non-metal Mineral Products 2.24 14.25 1.04 
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 0.65 15.98 0.68 
Manufacture of Chemical Raw Materials and 
Chemical Products 2.62 29.12 1.56 
Manufacture of Wine, Beverages and Tea 0.2 16.72 1.13 
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 0.19 6.86 1.07 
Processing of Petroleum, Coking and Nuclear Fuel 0.32 36.51 0.8 
Production and Supply of Electric Power and Heat 
Power 4.63 2.04 0.57 
Smelting and Processing of Ferrous Metals 2.24 25.5 0.33 
Smelting and Processing of Non-ferrous Metals 0.96 35.18 0.66 
 
5.3 Standardization/normalization 
Applying Equations 4, 5 and 6, the cardinally meaningful and ordinally 
meaningful standardized index is presented in Table A1 in the appendix. 
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5.4 Emissions Control Coefficients (ECCs) and their application 
    Based on the above formula, this part calculates an ECC for each industry and 
the calculation results are shown in Table A2 in the appendix. Given the need to set 
weights, this paper calculates ECCs under five scenarios, that is, AEDRs are 1.5%, 
2.5%, 3.9%, 4.5% and 5.5%. While 1.5% and 2.5% are low-target scenarios, 3.9% are 
planned target scenarios, and 4.5% and 5.5% are high target scenarios given that the 
3.9% scenario was determined on the basis of the CO2 reduction target per unit of 
GDP. According to the "13th Five-Year Plan for Controlling Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions" issued by the State Council, the target for CO2 reduction per unit of GDP 
during the "Thirteenth Five-Year Plan" period in Hubei Province is 19.5%. Therefore, 
it needs to decrease by 3.9% each year on average.‡  
From Table A2 in the appendix, the ECC for each industry not only reflects the 
industrial differences, but also are highly correlated with the AEDRs. The ECCs can 
been applied directly to the allocation of allowances without any additional effort. 
Fox example, if using the benchmark method, then enterprises’ free allowances will 
be: 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 × 𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 × 𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘. While we highlight the 
time dimension, it does not mean that the ECCs need to be adjusted yearly. The policy 
makers can decide how frequently they should be adjusted. 
5.5 Comparison of ECCs with other FA policies  
In this subsection, we compare the ECCs with other carbon leakage prevention 
policies.  
                                                             
‡ State Council, 2016. The "13th Five-Year Plan" Notification of Work Plan for Controlling Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions. The State Council of PRC, Beijing.  
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5.5.1 The Issue of fixed base year 
Firstly, we demonstrate the dynamic advantage by comparing the ECCs between 
2015 and 2016, which would not be the same using the traditional method. For the 
sake of simplicity, we calculated only the ECC of each industry in the 5% AEDR 
scenario using 2015 and 2016 data. As shown in Figure 3, eight of the 16 sectors 
would have decreased the ECCs in 2016, compared with 2015, while the other eight 
sectors would have increased the ECCs. The largest reduction among the ECCs was 
0.89% in the ‘Manufacture of Chemical Fibers’ sector. By contrast, the largest 
increase among the EECs was 0.44% in the ‘Processing of Petroleum, Coking and 
Nuclear Fuel’ sector. The adjustment, although minor in one year, could be significant 
over a longer period. The dynamics will change the relative FAs across the industries.  
 
Figure 3. Comparison between 2016 and 2015 of ECC 
5.5.2 Comparing with the EU Methodology without consideration of abatement 
potential 
Secondly, we illustrated the difference between the ECCs and the EU’s ETS 
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dichotomy classification using Hubei’s data for the 2016 allowance allocation. For the 
sake of demonstration, we used only the TI indicator and used the same 30% 
threshold to classify the 16 industries into two groups: risk industries and no-risk ones 
as in Table 5. According to the ETS Directive (Article 10a)(de Perthuis and Trotignon, 
2014), the risk group (R) would receive 100% FAs while the non-risk (NR) group 
would receive 55% FAs as in the third phase of the EU’s ETS.§ The difference in the 
FA percentage is at least 20%. However, in our method, the FA range is between 91% 
and 98%. The difference between the two methodologies ranges from -0.09 to 0.43. 
Table 5 Comparison of ECCs with dichotomy classification 
industries TI Type EU 
ETS 
ECCs Difference 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural 
Gas 
53.37  R 1 0.91  -0.09 
Manufacture of General-Purpose 
Machinery 
45.04  R 1 0.97  -0.03 
Processing of Petroleum, Coking 
and Nuclear Fuel 
36.51  R 1 0.96  -0.04 
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers 35.19  R 1 0.94  -0.06 
Smelting and Processing of Non-
ferrous Metals 
35.18  R 1 0.97  -0.03 
Manufacture of Raw Chemical 
Materials and Chemical Products 
29.12  NR 0.55 0.95  0.4 
Smelting and Processing of Ferrous 
Metals 
25.50  NR 0.55 0.98  0.43 
Manufacture of Foods 24.54  NR 0.55 0.93  0.38 
Manufacture of Automobiles 23.28  NR 0.55 0.94  0.39 
Manufacture of Metal Products 20.50  NR 0.55 0.96  0.41 
Manufacture of Wine, Beverages 
and Tea 
16.72  NR 0.55 0.95  0.4 
Manufacture of Medicines 16.71  NR 0.55 0.91  0.36 
Manufacture of Paper and Paper 
Products 
15.98  NR 0.55 0.96  0.41 
Manufacture of Non-metal Mineral 
Products 
14.25  NR 0.55 0.95  0.4 
Processing of Food from 
Agricultural Products 
6.86  NR 0.55 0.94  0.39 
Production and Supply of Electric 
Power and Heat Power 
2.04  NR 0.55 0.97  0.42 
Notes: R: risk group; NR: non-risk group. 
                                                             
§According to the ETS Directive (Article 10a), the FAs are gradually reduced across phase 3 (80% in 2013, and 




5.5.3 With or without consideration of abatement potential 
Thirdly, whether or not to consider the AP will also make a significant difference. 
The largest difference is seen in the sector ‘Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas’. 
When the AP is not considered, this sector would receive a 97% FA. However, when 
its energy intensity relative to the national average was considered, the FA would be 
reduced to 91% due to its high carbon intensity relative to the national average, and 
thus it has large abatement potential. This industry can reduce emissions by applying 
average-level technologies and thus its abatement cost will be low. On the contrary, 
some other industries are given higher percentage FAs due to their low abatement 
potential and thus high marginal abatement costs. These industries would be restricted 
in a carbon market without consideration of the AP, and thus the EECs with APs 
reward such advanced industry.  
Figure 4  The ECCs of Hubei in 2016, with or without considering AP 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
ECCs with AP 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97











The prevention of carbon leakages has been the core issue in the design of 
emission trading systems, and has attracted the attention of academicians, policy 
makers and industry practitioners. Most emissions trading systems adopt a tiered 
structure approach to divide industries into risk, no-risk, high risk, medium risk, and 
low risk, and adopt different free allowance allocation policies for different types. The 
tiered structure and arbitrarily set benchmark also cause unfairness among industries 
and inefficiencies in the emissions trading system. The dichotomy classification of 
industries has resulted in up to 83% of industries included in the list of carbon leakage 
risk, a poor measurement of the differences among industries. The carbon leakage 
policy has been one of the key causes of the carbon price collapse and carbon price 
signal failure in the EU ETS. 
In order to overcome the problems in the existing emissions trading system and 
to cater to developing countries’ context, this paper proposes a dynamic and 
continuous method, namely Emission Control Coefficients, and uses the data from 
Hubei Province to illustrate its application and advantages. In addition to the two 
indicators which are universally applied ̶ cost intensity and trade intensity ̶ we also 
suggest abatement potential as the third indicator. The abatement potential indicator is 
conducive to developing countries’ industry catching up with developed countries, 
and the establishment of a tighter cost constraint mechanism. Emission Control 
Coefficients are better able to maintain a balance between competitiveness protection 
and mitigation intensives. For the common two indicators, we follow the practice of 
the EU ETS, but we propose use of a yearly average price instead of fixed carbon 
prices to allow for dynamic adjustment. To avoid inequality, this method also replaces 
the dichotomy classification of industries with a continuous method.  
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Dynamic Emission Control Coefficients are better able to cope with economic 
fluctuations, technological advances and trade pattern changes, keeping the carbon 
cost constraint in each industry at an accurate level. Continuous Emission Control 
Coefficients can accurately reflect the differences between industries and reduce the 
distortions in competitiveness among industries within and out of the risk. Emission 
Control Coefficients improve the effectiveness and fairness of allowance allocations, 
and provide incentives for enterprises to invest in low-carbon technologies. By 
comparing the free allowances allocation methods between Emission Control 
Coefficients and the EU ETS, we found that Emission Control Coefficients can 
largely overcome the shortcomings of the EU ETS, and they are also suitable for 
developing countries without absolute CO2 emission reduction targets.    
Emission Control Coefficients were tested in Hubei’s ETS for four years (2015-
2018), and proved that they were feasible and effective. Our study generates the 
following policy implications: 
Firstly, while it is necessary to grant free allowances to prevent carbon leakages, 
the allowance allocation method needs to be improved to avoid carbon prices which 
are too low. The long-term slump in carbon prices will reduce the confidence to invest 
in low-carbon technologies resulting in market ineffectiveness. In the design of 
China’s national ETS, it is necessary to introduce a carbon leakage prevention policy 
that reflects industry differences.  
Secondly, dynamic free allowances adjustment mechanisms need to be established 
based on the changes in the industry's trade intensity, cost intensity and abatement 
potential, which improve the fairness and efficiency of the ETS. Therefore, for some 
industries, they should not be overly protected or pressured, and should establish a 
dynamic free allowances adjustment mechanism.  
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Thirdly, it is necessary to establish a clear and definite carbon cost constraint 
signal for industries rather than protecting them indefinitely. By considering the 
abatement potential of each industry, it is necessary to force the backward industries 
to gradually catch up to the world’s advanced level and gradually complete the 
transition to low-carbon operations. 
However, this paper relies solely on data from Hubei Province to verify the 
applicability of ECCs and does not consider the loss of competitiveness brought about 
by domestic trade. These two limitations are the direction of future research. 
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Table A1 Results of Standardization for industries in Hubei province (2016) 
Industry SCI STI SAP 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.92 0.00 1.00 
Manufacture of Automobiles 1.00 0.59 0.42 
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers 0.72 0.35 0.57 
Manufacture of Foods 0.92 0.56 0.61 
Manufacture of General-Purpose Machinery 0.99 0.16 0.14 
Manufacture of Medicines 0.97 0.71 0.75 
Manufacture of Metal Products 0.95 0.64 0.19 
Manufacture of Non-metal Mineral Products 0.54 0.76 0.27 
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 0.90 0.73 0.13 
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical 
Products 
0.45 0.47 0.47 
Manufacture of Wine, Beverages and Tea 1.00 0.71 0.31 
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 1.00 0.91 0.28 
Processing of Petroleum, Coking and Nuclear Fuel 0.97 0.33 0.18 
Production and Supply of Electric Power and Heat 
Power 
0.00 1.00 0.09 
Smelting and Processing of Ferrous Metals 0.54 0.54 0.00 
Smelting and Processing of Non-ferrous Metals 0.83 0.35 0.13 
 










1.5% 2.5% 3.9% 4.5% 5.5% 
Extraction of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
0.9759  0.9599  0.9374  0.9278  0.9118  
Manufacture of Automobiles 0.9826  0.9711  0.9548  0.9479  0.9363  
Manufacture of Chemical 
Fibers 
0.9793  0.9655  0.9462  0.9379  0.9241  
Manufacture of Foods 0.9781  0.9636  0.9432  0.9344  0.9199  
Manufacture of General-
Purpose Machinery 
0.9910  0.9850  0.9766  0.9730  0.9670  
Manufacture of Medicines 0.9739  0.9564  0.9321  0.9216  0.9042  
Manufacture of Metal 
Products 
0.9872  0.9787  0.9668  0.9617  0.9532  
Manufacture of Non-metal 
Mineral Products 
0.9861  0.9768  0.9638  0.9582  0.9489  
Manufacture of Paper and 
Paper Products 
0.9882  0.9803  0.9692  0.9645  0.9566  
37 
 
Manufacture of Raw 
Chemical Materials and 
Chemical Products 
0.9835  0.9725  0.9571  0.9505  0.9395  
Manufacture of Wine, 
Beverages and Tea 
0.9843  0.9739  0.9592  0.9529  0.9425  
Processing of Food from 
Agricultural Products 
0.9839  0.9732  0.9582  0.9518  0.9411  
Processing of Petroleum, 
Coking and Nuclear Fuel 
0.9906  0.9843  0.9755  0.9718  0.9655  
Production and Supply of 
Electric Power and Heat 
Power 
0.9913  0.9854  0.9773  0.9738  0.9679  
Smelting and Processing of 
Ferrous Metals 
0.9932  0.9887  0.9824  0.9797  0.9752  
Smelting and Processing of 
Non-ferrous Metals 
0.9908  0.9846  0.9761  0.9724  0.9662  
 
 
